Here is na excellent article that spells out the difficulties that America had in trying to defeat the Vietminh. They knew nothing of the history of struggle in Vietnam that had resulted from a millenia of resistance to Chinese occupation. The Vietnamese had fought off everyone from European settlers to Genghis Khan himself, they would be very difficult to defeat militarily, but harder still to break the morale of the nation.
Read here for more
Wednesday, 3 March 2010
Friday, 19 February 2010
Real Voices Of WWII
Here is a link to a sneak preview of a documentary called No Bridge Too Far, a story of the Engineer Corps of the US Army during the war who served in North Africa, Italy, France and Germany. It features the voices of veteransm now in their 80's and is a great source of primary information.
Tuesday, 16 February 2010
Sunday, 14 February 2010
Russia, old and new
This is just a quick note, I've got a lesson about Napoleon III to teach in a moment so I will return to this later. This article in the Independent caught my eye. This is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, this is nothing new, it's a pretty time honoured response of Russia to the states on her border and also to the management of the shared past in Russia itself. Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to adopt a scandanavian style of democractic socialism at the end of the 1980s when it became abundantly clear that the command model of economic mangement wasn't working. In The Shock Doctrine Naomi Klein makes a number of interesting parallels between the October Revolution/Bolshevik coup d'etat and the establishment of the oligarch's Russia. In both instances, a democratic people's revolution had taken place beforehand, and in both instances a dedicated, power hungry and deeply politicised elite group clung on to the coat tails of the people's revolution and subverted it using armed force.
She writes: "Once again a group of self-described revolutionaries huddled in secret to write a radical economic program. As Dimitry Vasiliev, one of the key reformers, recalled, "At the start, we didn't have a single employee, not even a secretary. We didn't have any equipment, not even a fax machine. And in those conditions, in just a month and a half, we had to write a comprehensive privatization program, we had to write twenty normative laws... It was really a romantic period."
On October 28, 1991, Yeltsin announced the lifting of price controls, predicting that "the liberalization of prices will put everything in its right place." The "reformers" waited only one week after Gorbachev resigned to launch their economic shock therapy program-the second of the three traumatic shocks. The shock therapy program also included free-trade policies and the first phase of the rapid-fire privatization of the country's approximately 225,000 state-owned companies."
Following this Yeltsin effectively staged an anti parliamentary coup by attacking Russia's White house in October 1993, he did so to quell the many mutinous voices who lamented the pillaging of the Russian economy by domestic and foreign 'capitalists'.
"A clear signal from Washington or the EU could have forced Yeltsin to engage in serious negotiations with the parliamentarians, but he received only incouragement. Finally, on the morning of October 4, 1993, Yeltsin fullfilled his long-prescribed destiny and became Russia's very own Pinochet, unleashing a series of violent events with unmistakable echoes of the coup in Chile exactly twenty years earlier. In what was the third traumatic shock inflicted by Yeltsin on the Russian people, he ordered a reluctant army to storm the Russian Whitehouse, setting it on fire and leaving charred the very building he had built his reputation defending just two years earlier. Communism may have collasped without thr firing of a shot, but Chicago-style capitalism, it turned out, required a great deal of gunfire to defend itself: Yeltsin called in five thousand soldiers, dozens of tanks and armored personel carriers, helicopters and elite shock troops armed with automatic machine guns-all to defend Russia's new capitalist economy from the grave threat of democracy"
This was the political backdrop to the previously most recent re-writing of Russia's history. Glasnost has very little to do with burying the memory of Stalin and discrediting October 1917, instead the violent imposition of free market capitalism has required a wholsale re-writing of history. Soviet communism wasn't regarded as a mistake from any human or humanist point of view, as many of the violent anti democratic practices from state repression to imperialist war in Chechnaya still endure. It was regarded as a mistake from the point of view of market orthodoxy, the free market revolutionaries of the 1980s and 90s helped to create a coup in Russia's system of ownership and in her collective memory.
More fool them, Russians are up there with the Irish for long cultural memory, the sufferings of the Russian people have been such that their very survival has depended on an ability to remember. Neoliberalism is in tatters, a totally bankrupt and utterly discredited idea, spread throughout the world with evangelical zeal. Unfortunately the former USSR bought into the idea when she was in a vulnerable position, it was a mistake that cost, New Internationalist estimates $400 billion in wealth siltd out of the country, never to be returned. History is being re-written again, authoritarian nationalists are in charge, the old glory days of Kursk and Berlin are being reimagined for a new generation as many Russians are waking up to the strong suspicion that they've been done over royally by the perennially untrustworthy west. In the west there is a new and mounting post Litvinenko paranoia about Russia. Again, thisis nothing new, the last 200 years have been marked by an almost never ending concern about Russia and her plans, the 1840's saw extraordinary levels of British public animosity towards Russia, all fuelled by rampantly jingoistic newspapers, the 'Great Game'.
She writes: "Once again a group of self-described revolutionaries huddled in secret to write a radical economic program. As Dimitry Vasiliev, one of the key reformers, recalled, "At the start, we didn't have a single employee, not even a secretary. We didn't have any equipment, not even a fax machine. And in those conditions, in just a month and a half, we had to write a comprehensive privatization program, we had to write twenty normative laws... It was really a romantic period."
On October 28, 1991, Yeltsin announced the lifting of price controls, predicting that "the liberalization of prices will put everything in its right place." The "reformers" waited only one week after Gorbachev resigned to launch their economic shock therapy program-the second of the three traumatic shocks. The shock therapy program also included free-trade policies and the first phase of the rapid-fire privatization of the country's approximately 225,000 state-owned companies."
Following this Yeltsin effectively staged an anti parliamentary coup by attacking Russia's White house in October 1993, he did so to quell the many mutinous voices who lamented the pillaging of the Russian economy by domestic and foreign 'capitalists'.
"A clear signal from Washington or the EU could have forced Yeltsin to engage in serious negotiations with the parliamentarians, but he received only incouragement. Finally, on the morning of October 4, 1993, Yeltsin fullfilled his long-prescribed destiny and became Russia's very own Pinochet, unleashing a series of violent events with unmistakable echoes of the coup in Chile exactly twenty years earlier. In what was the third traumatic shock inflicted by Yeltsin on the Russian people, he ordered a reluctant army to storm the Russian Whitehouse, setting it on fire and leaving charred the very building he had built his reputation defending just two years earlier. Communism may have collasped without thr firing of a shot, but Chicago-style capitalism, it turned out, required a great deal of gunfire to defend itself: Yeltsin called in five thousand soldiers, dozens of tanks and armored personel carriers, helicopters and elite shock troops armed with automatic machine guns-all to defend Russia's new capitalist economy from the grave threat of democracy"
This was the political backdrop to the previously most recent re-writing of Russia's history. Glasnost has very little to do with burying the memory of Stalin and discrediting October 1917, instead the violent imposition of free market capitalism has required a wholsale re-writing of history. Soviet communism wasn't regarded as a mistake from any human or humanist point of view, as many of the violent anti democratic practices from state repression to imperialist war in Chechnaya still endure. It was regarded as a mistake from the point of view of market orthodoxy, the free market revolutionaries of the 1980s and 90s helped to create a coup in Russia's system of ownership and in her collective memory.
More fool them, Russians are up there with the Irish for long cultural memory, the sufferings of the Russian people have been such that their very survival has depended on an ability to remember. Neoliberalism is in tatters, a totally bankrupt and utterly discredited idea, spread throughout the world with evangelical zeal. Unfortunately the former USSR bought into the idea when she was in a vulnerable position, it was a mistake that cost, New Internationalist estimates $400 billion in wealth siltd out of the country, never to be returned. History is being re-written again, authoritarian nationalists are in charge, the old glory days of Kursk and Berlin are being reimagined for a new generation as many Russians are waking up to the strong suspicion that they've been done over royally by the perennially untrustworthy west. In the west there is a new and mounting post Litvinenko paranoia about Russia. Again, thisis nothing new, the last 200 years have been marked by an almost never ending concern about Russia and her plans, the 1840's saw extraordinary levels of British public animosity towards Russia, all fuelled by rampantly jingoistic newspapers, the 'Great Game'.
Sunday night
Sunday night roundup
At the moment I am being the very worst of my book junkie self and reading first chapters of lots of different books. Last night I read the first chapter in Howard Zinn's People's History of the USA, I am a great hedger of bets when it comes to allying myself with different schools of history, I don't completely discount the idea that 'great men' have in some instances, had an impact on history, but I am far keener on the idea that it is historical forces that are far beyond the control of individuals or movements that determine things to a far greater extent. A people's history can be loosely described as a view of the world that is the story of mass movements and of the outsiders. Society's curent default setting when coming to evaulate the past is heavily influenced by today's hyper induvidualism. A society that worships the self above all things is hardly likely to pay any attention to the notion that their current wealth and prosperity is based in large part on a forgotten notion of solidarity, collective struggle and sacrifice for ideals greater than the individual. It's far easier for the children (and in some cases grandchildren) of the ME generation to look at history as a succession of 'great men' who did things becuase they were determined, single minded and above all 'right'.
The first of these 'great men' that Zinn looks at is of course Columbus. The Venetian weavers son and master mariner decided to try to emulate Marco Polo but this time to find a sea route to Asia, knowing, as all the most educated men of the age knew, that the world was round. He did not expect for the continent of the Americas to be in the way. He discovered the Bahamas, then Cuba, and then Haiti and in doing so began the genocide of the Arawak people. The figures vary, whether Columbus and his successors murdered one million, three million or eight million people is unclear, but surely on of the most monstrous and bloodthirsty campaigns in history was perptrated against the peoples of the Carribean, and it was their extinction that made the Spanish think next of African captives to replace them. Columbus was desperate for the Arawak's gold, gold that barely existed, in order to pay back the loans underwriting his voyage, so desperate that he forced every Arawak to deliver a quantity of gold per month, those that did got a copper trinket, those found without the trinket had their hands chopped off. Columbus will never, ever be mentioned in the same breath as Hitler, Stalin, Ivan the Terrible or Mao, even though he is guilty of comparable crimes. the reason for this is because the ideologies underpinning the Nazis or the Russian or Chinese Communists is too alien to us, to contrary to our ways of understanding the world. Greed we can get, empire, we understand. The idea that in creating something as glorious as the Americas, a few eggs had to be broken along the way is something that most of us have assimilated and naturalised a long time ago. It does not make for comfortable thinking that a large part of the West (and therefore our) way of life is built upon genocide. Columbus the Mariner is the limits of what we can accept, not Columbus the mass murderer.
Other books I perused last night were a couple of second hand titles on the Wilson Plot and Kenneth O. Morgan's The People's Peace. More on both later.
At the moment I am being the very worst of my book junkie self and reading first chapters of lots of different books. Last night I read the first chapter in Howard Zinn's People's History of the USA, I am a great hedger of bets when it comes to allying myself with different schools of history, I don't completely discount the idea that 'great men' have in some instances, had an impact on history, but I am far keener on the idea that it is historical forces that are far beyond the control of individuals or movements that determine things to a far greater extent. A people's history can be loosely described as a view of the world that is the story of mass movements and of the outsiders. Society's curent default setting when coming to evaulate the past is heavily influenced by today's hyper induvidualism. A society that worships the self above all things is hardly likely to pay any attention to the notion that their current wealth and prosperity is based in large part on a forgotten notion of solidarity, collective struggle and sacrifice for ideals greater than the individual. It's far easier for the children (and in some cases grandchildren) of the ME generation to look at history as a succession of 'great men' who did things becuase they were determined, single minded and above all 'right'.
The first of these 'great men' that Zinn looks at is of course Columbus. The Venetian weavers son and master mariner decided to try to emulate Marco Polo but this time to find a sea route to Asia, knowing, as all the most educated men of the age knew, that the world was round. He did not expect for the continent of the Americas to be in the way. He discovered the Bahamas, then Cuba, and then Haiti and in doing so began the genocide of the Arawak people. The figures vary, whether Columbus and his successors murdered one million, three million or eight million people is unclear, but surely on of the most monstrous and bloodthirsty campaigns in history was perptrated against the peoples of the Carribean, and it was their extinction that made the Spanish think next of African captives to replace them. Columbus was desperate for the Arawak's gold, gold that barely existed, in order to pay back the loans underwriting his voyage, so desperate that he forced every Arawak to deliver a quantity of gold per month, those that did got a copper trinket, those found without the trinket had their hands chopped off. Columbus will never, ever be mentioned in the same breath as Hitler, Stalin, Ivan the Terrible or Mao, even though he is guilty of comparable crimes. the reason for this is because the ideologies underpinning the Nazis or the Russian or Chinese Communists is too alien to us, to contrary to our ways of understanding the world. Greed we can get, empire, we understand. The idea that in creating something as glorious as the Americas, a few eggs had to be broken along the way is something that most of us have assimilated and naturalised a long time ago. It does not make for comfortable thinking that a large part of the West (and therefore our) way of life is built upon genocide. Columbus the Mariner is the limits of what we can accept, not Columbus the mass murderer.
Other books I perused last night were a couple of second hand titles on the Wilson Plot and Kenneth O. Morgan's The People's Peace. More on both later.
Saturday, 13 February 2010
Two views on Welsh history
I recently mannaged to acquire a copy of "When Was Wales?" by Gwyn Alf Williams, a book which I'd had recommended to me by a couple of people that I know as a good overview of Welsh history from a marxian perspective. (The book is sadly out of print, which is a great shame as it offers a a lively and clearly written commentary on the history of Wales.)
During the 1980s, Williams was something of a household name in Wales due to the success of The Dragon Has Two Tongues, a TV series which he co-hosted with Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, in which the two historians engaged in bitter polemical exchanges concerning the way in which the history of their country ought to be interpreted. The casting of Williams the firebrand and the gentrified Vaughan-Thomas as ideological sparring partners was a stroke of televisual genius which drew in a wider audience than most historical programming of the time - I've been told (perhaps with some exaggeration) that the pubs would empty when it was on. Hard to imagine something similar happening for Simon Schama. The first episode of this landmark documentary can be viewed on YouTube. Unfortunately no DVD release appears to be forthcoming.
The book opens with R.S. Thomas' poem Welsh History, which is appended by a caveat from Williams: "This fine poem expresses some historical truths. It also sanctifies a monstrous historical lie." The truths and the lie are not identified by the author. The reader must proceed and attempt to establish these things on their own.
Williams' main preoccupations are "when to begin?", "when, if ever, has Wales been able to describe itself as an independent nation?" and "will it ever be able to do so again?". He sees the Welsh people as a nation emerging from the ruins of the declining Roman Empire - an embattled group of Brythonic speakers who would come to be left isolated in two Western peninsulars of Great Britain. The Welsh people, as they would come to be known, are a people continually in a state of crisis, moulded by a series of shocks inflicted from outside. It's in this aspect of his analysis that Williams' thinking is most obviously Marxist - Marx's famous dictum to the effect that "men make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing" echoes resoundingly throughout these pages. The withdrawal of the Romans, the Anglo-Saxon ascendancy beyond Offa's Dyke, a series invasions from other parts of Britain and Ireland, the instability of the various historical kingdoms of Wales, the "Act of Union", partial industrialisation and Anglicisation are all narrated as a stream of events influencing the development of the Welsh as a stateless nation.
Williams has a gift for witty and provocative turns of phrase, one of my favourites being "those who the Gods wish to destroy, they first inflict with a language problem" - a wry comment on the linguistic divisions that affect Wales. (One of the notable features of modern Welsh nationalism is its traditional difficulty in attracting English-speaking voters from south Wales - given that over fifty percent of the population of Wales resides in south Wales, this is a problem with significant implications for the success of the Welsh nationalist project. Compare the position of the SNP: unafflicted by such a linguistic divide, save for a small number of scattered communities, its succeeded in securing a leading position in the Scottish Parliament.)
In many ways this is very much a book of its time: written in the aftermath of the disastrous 1979 St David's Day referendum on an elected assembly for Wales (in which only 20% voted in favour), the author sees little hope for the future of the Welsh nation - indeed, he concludes by describing the Welsh as "nothing but a naked people under an acid rain".
It's interesting to compare the content and tone of William's work with John Davies' A History of Wales. At over 700 pages, it's a much more weighty work than "When Was Wales?" (in comparison, a relatively concise work at just over 300 pages). Originally published in Welsh as Hanes Cymru in 1990, then published in English in 1993, the new 2007 edition contains a new chapter on developments in Wales since 1997. In contrast to Williams, Davies opts for a more sober reporting of what is thought to have occurred over the course of Welsh history. The first chapter begins with a brief discussion of the various points at which the beginning of the history of the Welsh people have been posited and then, accepting that while there are valid arguments for starting the story at any of those dates, chooses to start with a discussion of the archeological evidence concerning the earliest life in what we now know as Wales.
The scope of the text is amazing; Davies weaves a skillful synthesis of the political, social and cultural history of Welsh life which is undoubtably fast becoming the definitive book on the subject. I think what I most admire about his writing is that it offers a detailed description of events, presenting to the reader a considered analysis that never loses its lucidity.
The point at which the tone of the two books is most noticably different is in their conclusion. As already noted, Williams' book is rather pessimistic about the future of the Welsh. Davies, in contrast, seems remarkably upbeat. In the closing pages of his book, he notes a number of structural and cultural developments that he regards as "the building blocks of a nation" and states that he believes "the Welsh nation in its fullness is yet to be". Can this difference in perception be attributed mainly to the age in which the two texts were published - about thirty years apart - or to one of temperament and political sensibility? Williams states in his closing chapter: "Small wonder then that some, looking ahead, see nothing but a nightmare vision of a depersonalised Wales which has shrivelled up into a Costa Bureaucratica in the south and a Costa Geriatrica in the north; in between, sheep, holiday homes burning merrily away and fifty folk museums where there used to be communities." He sees the economic devastation of vast swathes of his country, plundered over the ages by an extractionist economy. Davies sees a number of symbols of future statehood emerging and concludes that there is hope for the future. Which of these two visions will be realised remains open to question. What is certain is that both of these books are required reading for anyone interested in the subject.
-- Contributed by David H
During the 1980s, Williams was something of a household name in Wales due to the success of The Dragon Has Two Tongues, a TV series which he co-hosted with Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, in which the two historians engaged in bitter polemical exchanges concerning the way in which the history of their country ought to be interpreted. The casting of Williams the firebrand and the gentrified Vaughan-Thomas as ideological sparring partners was a stroke of televisual genius which drew in a wider audience than most historical programming of the time - I've been told (perhaps with some exaggeration) that the pubs would empty when it was on. Hard to imagine something similar happening for Simon Schama. The first episode of this landmark documentary can be viewed on YouTube. Unfortunately no DVD release appears to be forthcoming.
The book opens with R.S. Thomas' poem Welsh History, which is appended by a caveat from Williams: "This fine poem expresses some historical truths. It also sanctifies a monstrous historical lie." The truths and the lie are not identified by the author. The reader must proceed and attempt to establish these things on their own.
Williams' main preoccupations are "when to begin?", "when, if ever, has Wales been able to describe itself as an independent nation?" and "will it ever be able to do so again?". He sees the Welsh people as a nation emerging from the ruins of the declining Roman Empire - an embattled group of Brythonic speakers who would come to be left isolated in two Western peninsulars of Great Britain. The Welsh people, as they would come to be known, are a people continually in a state of crisis, moulded by a series of shocks inflicted from outside. It's in this aspect of his analysis that Williams' thinking is most obviously Marxist - Marx's famous dictum to the effect that "men make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing" echoes resoundingly throughout these pages. The withdrawal of the Romans, the Anglo-Saxon ascendancy beyond Offa's Dyke, a series invasions from other parts of Britain and Ireland, the instability of the various historical kingdoms of Wales, the "Act of Union", partial industrialisation and Anglicisation are all narrated as a stream of events influencing the development of the Welsh as a stateless nation.
Williams has a gift for witty and provocative turns of phrase, one of my favourites being "those who the Gods wish to destroy, they first inflict with a language problem" - a wry comment on the linguistic divisions that affect Wales. (One of the notable features of modern Welsh nationalism is its traditional difficulty in attracting English-speaking voters from south Wales - given that over fifty percent of the population of Wales resides in south Wales, this is a problem with significant implications for the success of the Welsh nationalist project. Compare the position of the SNP: unafflicted by such a linguistic divide, save for a small number of scattered communities, its succeeded in securing a leading position in the Scottish Parliament.)
In many ways this is very much a book of its time: written in the aftermath of the disastrous 1979 St David's Day referendum on an elected assembly for Wales (in which only 20% voted in favour), the author sees little hope for the future of the Welsh nation - indeed, he concludes by describing the Welsh as "nothing but a naked people under an acid rain".
It's interesting to compare the content and tone of William's work with John Davies' A History of Wales. At over 700 pages, it's a much more weighty work than "When Was Wales?" (in comparison, a relatively concise work at just over 300 pages). Originally published in Welsh as Hanes Cymru in 1990, then published in English in 1993, the new 2007 edition contains a new chapter on developments in Wales since 1997. In contrast to Williams, Davies opts for a more sober reporting of what is thought to have occurred over the course of Welsh history. The first chapter begins with a brief discussion of the various points at which the beginning of the history of the Welsh people have been posited and then, accepting that while there are valid arguments for starting the story at any of those dates, chooses to start with a discussion of the archeological evidence concerning the earliest life in what we now know as Wales.
The scope of the text is amazing; Davies weaves a skillful synthesis of the political, social and cultural history of Welsh life which is undoubtably fast becoming the definitive book on the subject. I think what I most admire about his writing is that it offers a detailed description of events, presenting to the reader a considered analysis that never loses its lucidity.
The point at which the tone of the two books is most noticably different is in their conclusion. As already noted, Williams' book is rather pessimistic about the future of the Welsh. Davies, in contrast, seems remarkably upbeat. In the closing pages of his book, he notes a number of structural and cultural developments that he regards as "the building blocks of a nation" and states that he believes "the Welsh nation in its fullness is yet to be". Can this difference in perception be attributed mainly to the age in which the two texts were published - about thirty years apart - or to one of temperament and political sensibility? Williams states in his closing chapter: "Small wonder then that some, looking ahead, see nothing but a nightmare vision of a depersonalised Wales which has shrivelled up into a Costa Bureaucratica in the south and a Costa Geriatrica in the north; in between, sheep, holiday homes burning merrily away and fifty folk museums where there used to be communities." He sees the economic devastation of vast swathes of his country, plundered over the ages by an extractionist economy. Davies sees a number of symbols of future statehood emerging and concludes that there is hope for the future. Which of these two visions will be realised remains open to question. What is certain is that both of these books are required reading for anyone interested in the subject.
-- Contributed by David H
The German Revolution 1918
Was Germany fighting a low level civil war from 1918 onwards? A social truce the Burgfreid (peace within the fortress) had been informally agreed upon at that outset of World War One by the left and right, the social tensions that had in some ways made war more attractive to the Kaiser were suspended until at least 1916, thus indicating to the Emperor that an appeal to national sentiment had paid off.
From 1916 onwards Hindenburg and Ludendorff ruled Germany as de-facto military dictators. The failure of the Schlieffen Plan had placed unsustainable pressures on Germany, she was now faced with a war on two fronts, the kind of war that Bismarck had spent three decades trying to keep Germany out of because he could predict the likely consequences.
One of those consequences was an end to the Burgfried, and by 1918 there was more than simply a clamour for peace. Germany's working classes, represented by the SPD and KPD parties (the KPD having split off from the SPD during the war) now began to articulate a very different idea of what Germany should be about. They looked beyond simply an armistice and began to envision a post- Imperial Germany, a country without a warlike and militaristic Kaiser, who seemed to have dragged Germany into a titanic conflict she couldn't win. They agitated for both political and social revolution, a profound re-ordering of society, the removal of the anachronistic Junker class and on the moderate left, the creation of a fully representative party. On the far left the likes of Karl Liebnicht and Rosa Luxembourg demanded a soviet style government, akin to the new USSR.
In the end the decision to send the German Navy back out to see in one last suicide mission against British Admiral Jellicoe's Dreadnoughts to salvage German honour and die in the process, pushed German sailors over the edge, resulting in mutiny. Convinced the revolution had broken out and that he was likely to suffer the Czar of Russia's fate, The Kaiser fled, ensuring that the 'revolution' of 1918 was successful. It was Ludendorff that helped to send the Kaiser on his way, telling him that he had no other choice and then arranging for a civilian government to take his place. Prince Max of Baden headed up a government of Social Democrats and Centre Party members, while Ludendorff laughed into his sleeve. Their first task would be the task that meant they were permanently despised by most Germans, it would be the signing of the armistice and then the Treaty of Versailles.
Ludendorff ensured that he and the army and his old aristocratic Junker friends were not tarred with the traitor brush by having nothing at all to do with Versailles. Max of Baden was quickly replaced by Friedrich Ebert, Social Democrat, and Germany's old order, the aristocracy, army, civil service and judiciary sat back to see how the new civilian government would get along. Knowing that the government was forever crippled by the treaty of Versailles meant that it would be easy at some point to take power back from them and re-shape German society in the interests of those on high.
The left were not the only people in 1918 with new ideas about how Germany should be run. Soldiers returning from the war found it difficult to comprehend how the war had been lsot, from their perspective, they had been winning, in the summer of 1918 they were 40 miles from Paris. Many of them thought that the war had been lost at home, but instead of blaming the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, the British Naval Blockade, the incompetence of the Kaiser's rule and the end of the Burgfreid, they looked to more convenient scapegoats. When Hitler began ministering to demobbed soldiers about the Jews in 1919, his words filled an emotional and conceptual gap in the thinking of many demobbed Wehrmacht men. Further to this there were many on the right in the 1920s who thought a new war was necessary and that an Imperial Germany with an empire in the east was the goal that should really be achieved. All the ideas that appear in Mein Kampf were free floating around the trenches and the barracks and other centres of reaction by 1919. Hitler articulated these ideas, crystalised them and repeated them ceaslessly to a receptive audience
From 1916 onwards Hindenburg and Ludendorff ruled Germany as de-facto military dictators. The failure of the Schlieffen Plan had placed unsustainable pressures on Germany, she was now faced with a war on two fronts, the kind of war that Bismarck had spent three decades trying to keep Germany out of because he could predict the likely consequences.
One of those consequences was an end to the Burgfried, and by 1918 there was more than simply a clamour for peace. Germany's working classes, represented by the SPD and KPD parties (the KPD having split off from the SPD during the war) now began to articulate a very different idea of what Germany should be about. They looked beyond simply an armistice and began to envision a post- Imperial Germany, a country without a warlike and militaristic Kaiser, who seemed to have dragged Germany into a titanic conflict she couldn't win. They agitated for both political and social revolution, a profound re-ordering of society, the removal of the anachronistic Junker class and on the moderate left, the creation of a fully representative party. On the far left the likes of Karl Liebnicht and Rosa Luxembourg demanded a soviet style government, akin to the new USSR.
In the end the decision to send the German Navy back out to see in one last suicide mission against British Admiral Jellicoe's Dreadnoughts to salvage German honour and die in the process, pushed German sailors over the edge, resulting in mutiny. Convinced the revolution had broken out and that he was likely to suffer the Czar of Russia's fate, The Kaiser fled, ensuring that the 'revolution' of 1918 was successful. It was Ludendorff that helped to send the Kaiser on his way, telling him that he had no other choice and then arranging for a civilian government to take his place. Prince Max of Baden headed up a government of Social Democrats and Centre Party members, while Ludendorff laughed into his sleeve. Their first task would be the task that meant they were permanently despised by most Germans, it would be the signing of the armistice and then the Treaty of Versailles.
Ludendorff ensured that he and the army and his old aristocratic Junker friends were not tarred with the traitor brush by having nothing at all to do with Versailles. Max of Baden was quickly replaced by Friedrich Ebert, Social Democrat, and Germany's old order, the aristocracy, army, civil service and judiciary sat back to see how the new civilian government would get along. Knowing that the government was forever crippled by the treaty of Versailles meant that it would be easy at some point to take power back from them and re-shape German society in the interests of those on high.
The left were not the only people in 1918 with new ideas about how Germany should be run. Soldiers returning from the war found it difficult to comprehend how the war had been lsot, from their perspective, they had been winning, in the summer of 1918 they were 40 miles from Paris. Many of them thought that the war had been lost at home, but instead of blaming the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, the British Naval Blockade, the incompetence of the Kaiser's rule and the end of the Burgfreid, they looked to more convenient scapegoats. When Hitler began ministering to demobbed soldiers about the Jews in 1919, his words filled an emotional and conceptual gap in the thinking of many demobbed Wehrmacht men. Further to this there were many on the right in the 1920s who thought a new war was necessary and that an Imperial Germany with an empire in the east was the goal that should really be achieved. All the ideas that appear in Mein Kampf were free floating around the trenches and the barracks and other centres of reaction by 1919. Hitler articulated these ideas, crystalised them and repeated them ceaslessly to a receptive audience
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